ADVANCED SECURITY

Trustless, by design

AMD SEV-SNP architecture guaranteeing technical impossibility of extracting your trading strategies, even with full administrator access.

– Definition

A proof that doesn't depend on us.

Trustless is not 'we promise to be careful with your data.' It is a stronger claim: the proof your report carries does not depend on us being honest, competent, or even still in business when someone reads it.

Concretely, the data flow is structured so that no human at AuditZK can read what you send, modify what was computed, or forge a report after the fact. The hardware enforces those properties; we don't.

– Fundamentals

The principle in practice.

The aggregator runs in an AMD SEV-SNP enclave where data extraction is technically impossible.

01

Cryptographic Isolation

Inviolable hardware security perimeter, even in case of system compromise.

02

Independent Verification

Verify yourself from your terminal using AMD tools.

YOUR DATA

████████████

██████████████

████████

Permanently encrypted

– Threat model

Whom you don't have to trust for the proof to hold.

Most platforms ask you to trust them and everything around them. Trustless removes that requirement. The proof remains valid even if every party below acts in bad faith.

01

AuditZK operators

Our engineers cannot read your API keys or your individual trades. The hardware key never leaves the silicon, so even root access to our servers reveals encrypted memory.

02

AuditZK as a company

We cannot forge a report. The signing key is bound to a specific enclave measurement; any change to the code that produces the report invalidates the attestation.

03

Our cloud provider

The hypervisor and the host OS run outside the enclave. They cannot decrypt enclave memory, and that is enforced by the chip, not by policy.

04

Our network

Credentials travel directly to the enclave over an ECDH-negotiated channel whose TLS certificate is bound to the enclave attestation. A man-in-the-middle on our infrastructure cannot reuse those credentials.

05

Our future

If AuditZK is acquired, sold, or shut down, attestations already embedded in old reports remain verifiable. A new owner cannot retroactively sign forged history under our identity.

DIRECT CONNECTION

Send credentials directly

The script generated in your dashboard encrypts your credentials in your terminal with the public key the enclave publishes in its attestation, then sends them to the enclave host. Our website and API servers never see them. It carries a sign-in token valid for 15 minutes.

# AuditZK E2E Connection: binance
# ECIES (ECDH P-256 + HKDF-SHA256 + AES-256-GCM)
# Requires: pip install cryptography

import json, os, ssl, sys, urllib.request, urllib.error
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM

# Configuration: replace the placeholder values
USER_UID = "YOUR_SERVICE_UID"
EXCHANGE = "binance"
API_KEY    = "YOUR_API_KEY"
API_SECRET = "YOUR_API_SECRET"
# Sign-in token for your account, valid 15 minutes from generation. Do not share this script.
TOKEN = "YOUR_SESSION_TOKEN"
ENCLAVE_URL = "https://enclave.auditzk.com"

print("Connecting to AuditZK enclave (E2E encrypted)...")
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
try:
    # 1. Fetch the enclave's E2E public key from its attestation
    with urllib.request.urlopen(f"{ENCLAVE_URL}/api/v1/attestation", context=ctx) as r:
        att = json.loads(r.read())
    print(f"  Enclave E2E key fingerprint: {att['e2eEncryption']['publicKeyFingerprint'][:16]}...")

    # 2. Encrypt the credentials here, before anything leaves this machine
    pub = serialization.load_pem_public_key(att["e2eEncryption"]["publicKey"].encode())
    eph = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
    shared = eph.exchange(ec.ECDH(), pub)
    aes_key = HKDF(algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), length=32, salt=None, info=b"enclave-e2e-encryption").derive(shared)
    iv = os.urandom(12)
    creds = json.dumps({"api_key": API_KEY, "api_secret": API_SECRET})
    ct = AESGCM(aes_key).encrypt(iv, creds.encode(), None)
    eph_pem = eph.public_key().public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo).decode()
    print("  Credentials encrypted (AES-256-GCM)")

    # 3. Send the ciphertext to the enclave
    payload = json.dumps({
        "user_uid": USER_UID, "exchange": EXCHANGE, "label": f"{EXCHANGE} account",
        "encrypted": { "ephemeralPublicKey": eph_pem, "iv": iv.hex(), "ciphertext": ct[:-16].hex(), "tag": ct[-16:].hex() }
    })
    req = urllib.request.Request(f"{ENCLAVE_URL}/api/v1/credentials/connect", data=payload.encode(),
        headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Authorization": f"Bearer {TOKEN}"})
    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx) as r:
        res = json.loads(r.read())
    if res.get("success"):
        print("SUCCESS: " + res.get("message", "Connection established"))
        print("Back in your dashboard, sync your connections to see this account.")
    else:
        print("ERROR: " + res.get("error", "Unknown error")); sys.exit(1)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as he:
    if he.code == 401:
        print("\nERROR: the sign-in token has expired. Generate a new script from your dashboard."); sys.exit(1)
    print(f"\nERROR: HTTP {he.code}: {he.read().decode(errors='replace')}"); sys.exit(1)
except Exception as e:
    print(f"\nERROR: {e}"); sys.exit(1)
Your terminal
AMD SEV-SNP
(web servers bypassed)
Generate my personalized script

Requires an AuditZK account

– Traditional vs Trustless

What changes when the proof leaves the platform.

A traditional report lives on a platform's servers: the proof depends on the platform. A trustless report carries its proof with it: the platform can disappear, the proof remains.

AxisTraditional reportingTrustless reporting
Source of proofPlatform-controlled recordHardware attestation embedded in the report
Editable after the factThe platform can rewrite historyAny change invalidates the signature
Offline verificationRequires the platform to be onlineAnyone can verify with public AMD tools
Dependence on the vendorVendor lock, proof dies if the company diesThe proof outlives the vendor
Operator access to your dataFull read accessNone, even with root privileges
Strategy exposureOften required to verify performanceAggregated metrics only, trades never leave the enclave

– Cryptographic properties

Hardware guarantees.

Hardware cryptographic properties guaranteeing technical impossibility of extraction.

01

Hardware Protection

  • AMD SEV-SNP Enclaves
  • Hardware encryption
  • Isolated memory

02

Total Transparency

  • 100% open-source code
  • Verifiable signatures
  • Independent audit

03

Client Control

  • Keys under your control
  • Direct transmission
  • No web exposure

Ready to start?

Generate your cryptographically certified performance reports.